The video-cassette retailer faces a challenging capacity problem. The peak popularity of a rental title lasts only a few weeks but the cost of a tape has traditionally been high relative to the price of a rental. In a conventional sales agreement, the retailer purchases each tape from his supplier for about $65 and collects about $3 per rental. Hence, a tape earns a pro…t only after 22 rentals. Because the demand for a tape typically starts high and tapers quickly, a retailer cannot justify purchasing enough tapes to cover the initial peak demand entirely.
At Blockbuster Inc., a large video retailer, the poor availability of new release videos was consistently a major customer complaint (McCollum, 1998 , Shapiro, 1998a . Seeking a solution to this problem, 1998 Blockbuster agreed to pay its suppliers a portion (probably in the range of 30-45%) of its rental income in exchange for a reduction in the initial price per tape from $65 to $8. 1 If Blockbuster kept half of the rental income, the break-even point for a tape would drop to approximately six rentals, thereby allowing Blockbuster to purchase many more tapes.
The introduction of revenue sharing coincided with a signi…cant improvement in performance at Blockbuster: Warren and Peers (2002) report that Blockbuster's market share of video rentals increased from 24% in 1997 to 40% in 2002. Not surprisingly, this has led to litigation against Blockbuster and the movie studios alleging that revenue sharing contracts have hurt competition in the industry. To date, these have been unsuccessful (Wall St. Journal, 2002 .) Indeed, evidence shows that the new terms of trade helped the industry in aggregate: Mortimer (2000) estimates revenue sharing increased the industry's total pro…t by 7%.
This paper studies how revenue sharing alters the performance of a supply chain. While inspired by the video-rental industry, our model encompasses many settings. It applies to any industry and any link between two levels in a supply chain (e.g., supplier-manufacturer or manufacturer-distributor). It does not matter whether the asset produced at the upstream level is rented at the downstream level (as in the video industry) or sold outright (as in the book industry) or whether demand is stochastic or deterministic. To be speci…c, our base model has a supplier selling to a single retailer. The retailer makes two decisions that 1 Blockbuster's terms are not public. Rentrak, a distributor, o¤ers the following: the studio gets 45% of the revenue, Rentrak 10%, and the retailer 45%. (www.rentrak.com).
Since Blockbuster deals directly with the studios, its terms should be at least as generous.
determine the total revenue generated over a single selling period: the number of units to purchase from a supplier and the retail price. The marketing literature often assumes the revenue function is derived from a deterministic demand curve (see Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy, 1992) , whereas the operations literature often assumes it is derived from stochastic demand with a …xed retail price, i.e., a newsvendor model (see Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal, 1998) . Our formulation includes both of those revenue functions. We show that revenue sharing coordinates this supply chain, i.e., the retailer chooses supply-chain optimal actions (quantity and price) and the supply chain's pro…t can be arbitrarily divided between the …rms. Further, a single revenues-sharing contract can coordinate a supply chain with multiple non-competing retailers even if the retailer's have di¤erent revenue functions.
Several alternative contracts have been shown to coordinate this supply chain when the revenue function is generated from a …xed-price newsvendor model: buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985) , quantity- ‡exibility (QF) contracts (Tsay, 1999) , and sales-rebate contracts (Taylor, 2000) . In fact, we show that revenue sharing and buy-back contracts are equivalent in this setting in the strongest sense: for any buy-back contract there exists a revenue-sharing contract that generates the same cash ‡ows for any realization of demand.
The comparable result does not hold between revenue sharing and the other two contracts.
However, revenue sharing and buy backs are not equivalent with a price-setting newsvendor.
While revenue sharing also coordinates that supply chain, neither buy backs nor quantity ‡exibility nor sales rebates are able to do so. Bernstein and Federgruen (2000) study pricediscount contracts and demonstrate that those contracts do coordinate the price-setting newsvendor. A price-discount contract has a wholesale price and a buy-back rate, just like a traditional buy-back contract, but coordination is achieved because both of the contract terms are conditional on the chosen retail price. To be speci…c, they are linear in the chosen retail price. While the description and implementation of a price-discount contract di¤ers from revenue sharing, we show that revenue sharing and price-discount contracts in the price-setting newsvendor model are equivalent, again, in the sense that they generate the same cash ‡ows for any realization of demand.
We next extend our base model to include quantity competing retailers, i.e., each retailer's revenue depends on its quantity as well as the other retailers' quantities. This framework includes Cournot competitors or competing newsvendors (as in Lippman and McCardle, 1997) . It has been observed in similar settings that simple wholesale-price contracts can coordinate this system (van Ryzin and Mahajan, 1999, and , but the coordinating wholesale price vector only allows one split of channel pro…t. We show that revenue sharing again allows coordination while supporting alternative pro…t allocations.
Our results suggest that revenue-sharing contracts are very e¤ective in a wide range of supply chains. However, they must have some limitations, otherwise we would expect to observe revenue sharing in every industry. We identify three. First, revenue sharing generally does not coordinate competing retailers when each retailer's revenue depends on its quantity, its price and the actions of the other retailers, e.g., competing price-setting newsvendors with each retailer's demand depending on the vector of retail prices. 2 For this setting more complex contracts are needed, e.g., additional parameters or non-linear components. Bernstein and Federgruen (2000) show that a non-linear version of the pricediscount contract does coordinate this setting.
A second limitation of revenue sharing, which is probably more signi…cant than the …rst, is the administrative burden it imposes on the …rms. Under revenue sharing, the supplier must monitor the retailer's revenues to verify that they are split appropriately. The gains from coordination may not always cover these costs. To explore this idea, we study the performance of the supply chain under a wholesale-price contract, which clearly has a lower administrative cost than revenue sharing. We demonstrate that there is considerable variation in supplychain performance under a wholesale-price contract and conclude that revenue sharing's administrative burden may explain why it is not implemented in some settings.
Finally, revenue sharing does not coordinate a supply chain when non-contractable, costly retailer e¤ort in ‡uences demand. Nevertheless, we show the supplier may still choose to implement revenue sharing if the impact of e¤ort is su¢ciently small. Several coordinating contracts have been o¤ered for this setting. The franchise literature suggests selling at marginal cost and charging franchise fees. For the newsvendor problem, Taylor (2000) suggests a sales-rebate contract combined with a buy-back contract. We o¤er a variation on revenue sharing, which acts like a quantity discount, to coordinate this supply chain.
The next section outlines our model. Section 2 studies how revenue sharing coordinates the supply chain and compares revenue sharing to other contracts. Section 3 considers multiple
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An exception is the case of perfect competition. See Dana and Spier (2001) for details. competing retailers and section 4 studies wholesale-price contracts. Section 5 investigates revenue sharing when costly retail e¤ort increases demand. The …nal section discusses our results and concludes.
The Model
Consider a supply chain with two risk neutral …rms, a supplier and a retailer. The retailer makes two decisions: the quantity of an asset, !¸0" it purchases from the supplier at the start of the selling season, and its price, #. We take the sales period as exogenously speci…ed.
For a model in which the sales period is endogenously speci…ed, see Gerchak, Cho and Ray (2001) . Only the retailer generates revenue in this supply chain. Let $(!" #) + %! be the retailer's total revenue over the sales period given its decisions, where % & 0 is possible.
$(!" #) only includes the revenue impact that can be directly attributed to the ! purchased units. The long run revenue impact of poor availability (e.g., a goodwill penalty for lost sales in a newsvendor model) is not included in our model. It can be shown that revenue sharing coordinates the …xed-price newsvendor with goodwill penalty costs and arbitrarily divides pro…ts, but with the price-setting newsvendor coordination can only be achieved for a single division of pro…t. The supplier's production cost is ' ! !; the retailer's cost, not including any payment to the supplier, is ' " !. Assume ' #¸0 for ( = )" *" and let ' = ' ! + ' " .
Before the retailer chooses ! and #" the supplier and the retailer agree to a revenue-sharing contract with two parameters. The …rst is the wholesale price the retailer pays per unit, +.
The second, ," is the retailer's share of revenue generated from each unit. The supplier's share is 1 ¡ ,. 3 A conventional wholesale-price contract is a revenue-sharing contract with , = 1. We assume the same revenue share is applied to all units. Pasternack (2002) considers a contract that allows for outright sales to the retailer on some units and revenue sharing on other units. That additional degree of freedom is not needed in our model.
To summarize, the …rms' pro…t functions are
Holmstrom (1988) demonstrates that in some cases it is advantageous if the revenue shares do not sum to one, but that constraint is reasonable in this setting.
and the supply chain's pro…t function is
Note that salvage revenues are shared. Rentrak, a distributor in the video rental industry, o¤ers contracts with such a provision. For a …xed retail price, revenue sharing achieves supply chain coordination even if only $(!" #) is shared. However, when # is a decision variable, then sharing %! is necessary to achieve coordination with arbitrary pro…t division.
This model is general enough to encompass several situations. If the retailer rents the asset, $(!" #) is interpreted as the rental revenues generated during the season and %! is the salvage revenue generated at the end of the season. If the retailer sells the asset, $(!" #) is the revenue generated from sales in addition to the certain salvage revenue !%. To explain, let /(!" #) be expected unit sales. Expected sales revenue is then #/(!" #) and expected salvage revenue is %(! ¡ /(!" #)). Total revenue is (# ¡ %)/(!" #) + %!" which conforms to our model
In either the rental or the outright sales case, $(!" #) can be derived from a deterministic or stochastic demand function. The newsvendor model is an example of the latter. In that model stochastic demand, 0(#)" occurs in a single selling season, and let 1 (2" #) = Pr(0(#) · 2). The expected unit sales function is /(!" #)" where
Supply chain coordination
This section …rst considers supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts and then compares and contrasts revenue sharing to several other contracts: buy-back, pricediscount, quantity- ‡exibility, sales-rebate, franchise and quantity discount.
Revenue-sharing contracts
Let f! % " # % g be a quantity-price pair that maximizes ¦(!" #). We assume ¦(!" #) is upper semi-continuous in ! and #" so f! % " # % g exists but it need not be unique. Revenue-sharing contracts achieve supply chain coordination by making the retailer's pro…t function an a¢ne transformation of the supply chain's pro…t function, hence f! % " # % g maximizes -" (!" #).
Theorem 1 Consider the set of revenue-sharing contracts with
and , 2 (0" 1]. With those contracts the …rms' pro…t functions are
and
is the retailer's optimal quantity and price, i.e., those contracts coordinate the supply chain.
Proof : Given the pro…t function (4), it follows that f! % " # % g maximizes the retailer's pro…t when , 5 0. To obtain (4), substitute + = ,'¡' " into (1) and simplify. The supplier's pro…t function follows from (4) and
The theorem indicates that , is the retailer's share of the supply chain's pro…t in addition to its share of revenue. Thus, revenue-sharing contracts coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate pro…t. The particular pro…t split chosen probably depends on the …rms' relative bargaining power. As the retailer's bargaining position becomes stronger, one would anticipate , increases. As a proxy for bargaining power, each …rm may have an outside opportunity pro…t, -& 5 0" that the …rm requires to engage in the relationship, i.e.,
& is required to gain …rm 6's participation. It is possible to satisfy both …rm's requirements when -" + -! & ¦(! % " # % )" but the feasible range for , will be more limited.
Extreme , values raises two other issues. First, the retailer's pro…t function becomes quite ‡at as , ! 0; while ! 0 remains optimal for the retailer, a deviation from ! % imposes little penalty on the retailer. Second, from (3), the coordinating wholesale price is actually negative when , & ' " 7'. Essentially, if the retailer's share of the channel's cost is high, the retailer is already in a low margin business before the supplier takes a slice of revenue.
If the supplier wants to claim a large portion of revenue, she must subsidize the retailer's acquisition of product. If one wishes to rule out negative wholesale price, then a positive retailer cost establishes a ‡oor on retailer pro…t under coordinating contracts.
The theorem also shows that coordination requires a wholesale price below the supplier's cost of production ' ! . The supplier loses money in selling the product and only makes money by participating in the retailer's revenue. Selling below cost is necessary because revenue sharing systematically drops the retailer's marginal revenue curve below the integrated supply chain's. To have marginal revenue equal marginal cost at the desired point, the retailer's marginal cost must also be less than the integrated system's.
Given that the set of coordinating contracts is independent of the revenue function, it follows immediately that a single revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the actions of multiple retailers with di¤erent revenue functions as long as each retailer's revenue is independent of the other retailer's actions (i.e., they do not compete) and they have the same marginal cost ' " . Section 3 considers revenue sharing with competing retailers. Pasternack (1985) was the …rst to identify that buy-back contracts coordinate the …xed-price newsvendor. With that contract the supplier charges a wholesale price + ' per unit and pays the retailer 8 per unit the retailer salvages. The retailer still collects the % salvage revenue per unit. (To accommodate the retailer actually returning units to the supplier, and the supplier salvages each unit for %" just increase
Other contracts
The supplier's pro…t function is
With a …xed retail price buy backs and revenue sharing are equivalent in a very strong sense.
Theorem 2 In the newsvendor setting with a …xed retail price, for any coordinating revenuesharing contract, f," +g" there exists a unique buy-back contract, f8" + ' g" that generates the same pro…t for each …rm for any realization of demand:
Proof : Let )(!" #) be realized revenue and replace $(!" #) with )(!" #) in both
and -" (!" #). The pro…t functions are the same if 1 ¡ 87(# ¡ %) = , and (' " + + ' ¡ 8 ¡ %) = ' " + + ¡ ,%. Rearranging terms and substituting + = ,' ¡ ' " from Theorem 1 yields (6) and (7). The analogous procedure con…rms the result for the supplier.¤
As can be seen from (5), under a buy-back contract the retailer pays the supplier 8 per unit sold and + ' ¡ 8 per unit purchased. Consequently, with the …xed-price newsvendor the supplier can implement revenue sharing by either requiring a percentage of realized revenue or by demanding a …xed payment per unit sold (as in Pasternack, 2002) . Dana and Spier (2001) note that this is also true in their model with perfect competition. However, one cannot coordinate a bilateral monopoly in which the retailer sets both the stocking level and retail price using revenue sharing based on a …xed payment per unit sold. In that case Marvel and Peck (1995) and Bernstein and Federgruen (2000) demonstrate that buy-back contracts coordinate the price-setting newsvendor only if the supplier earns zero pro…t. The problem is apparent in (6) and (7): unlike revenue sharing, the coordinating buy-back parameters depend on the retail price.
Buy backs would coordinate the price-setting newsvendor if the supplier could commit to adjust the buy back and wholesale price in response to any price chosen by the retailer.
To be speci…c, according to Theorem 2, coordination is achieved if the supplier announces that the buy-back rate will be 8(#) = (1 ¡ ,)(# ¡ %) and the wholesale price will be +(#) =
(1 ¡ ,)# + ,' ¡ ' " " i.e., the buy back rate and wholesale price are adjusted linearly in the retailer's price. That is precisely the contract studied by Bernstein and Federgruen (2000) , which they call a price-discount contract. 4 Thus, their contract is equivalent to revenue sharing in the strongest sense, i.e., for any revenue-sharing contract there exists a unique price-discount contract that generates the same pro…ts for both …rms no matter the realization of demand. Furthermore, the two approaches are equally costly to administer in the newsvendor setting: with the price-discount contract the retailer must report its retail price and its left over inventory, which, in combination with the retailer's order quantity, yields the retailer's sales, sales revenue and salvage revenue. Hence, the information collected to implement a price-discount contract yields the information needed to implement revenue sharing. However, it is not clear how to interpret a price-discount contract when revenues are generated from rental fees because then the retailer ends the season with the same number of units as it begins the season.
Although revenue sharing, buy backs and price-discount contracts are linked, the same is 4 Bernstein and Federgruen have the supplier earning the salvage revenue and ' " = 0.
Their coordinating contract is 8 0 (#) = 9(# ¡ %) + % and + 0 (#) = 9# + (1 ¡ 9)'" where
the retailer's total revenue from each unit salvaged is the same with either contract.
The wholesale prices are clearly the same given ' " = 0.
not true for all coordinating supply-chain contracts. Consider the quantity ‡exibility (QF) contract of Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) and Tsay (1999) with a …xed retail price. Here, the retailer purchases ! units for + ¢ per unit at the start of the season and may return up to ¢! units at the end of the season for a full refund, ¢ 2 [0" 1). Units that are not returned can be salvaged for % per unit. The retailer's expected pro…t is
For a …xed retail price, the key condition for coordination is
which occurs when
.
QF contracts also arbitrarily allocate pro…t (Tsay, 1999) . Consequently, the two contracts do not result in the same realized division of pro…t for all outcomes of demand. Further, coordinating QF contracts are not independent of the retailer's demand distribution.
While the QF contract coordinates the …xed-price newsvendor, it is less e¤ective with a price-setting newsvendor. For price to be coordinated as well we need at least
we see (8) is achieved only with ¢ = 0. With ¢ = 0" coordination of ! requires + ¢ = ' ! . So the only coordinating QF contract for a price-setting newsvendor has the supplier pricing at marginal cost and earning zero pro…t.
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Tsay (1999) and Taylor (2000) do not include ' " , but we conjecture that their results continue to hold in our setting.
The sales-rebate contract (Krishnan, Kapuscinski, Butz, 2001, and Taylor, 2000) also coordinates a newsvendor supply chain with a …xed price. The supplier charges the retailer a per unit wholesale price + but gives the retailer a rebate ) 5 0 per unit sold above a …xed threshold ; and the retailer continues to salvage left over units for % per unit:
The retailer's marginal pro…t is
)(
Thus, for !¸;" the sales-rebate contract acts like a revenue-sharing contract in the sense that one contract parameter, )" modi…es the retailer's marginal revenue and the second contract parameter, + ! " modi…es the retailer's marginal cost. However, unlike the revenuesharing contract, which modi…es the retailer's marginal revenue for all !" the sales-rebate contract does not modify the retailer's marginal revenue for ! & ;. Due to the inclusion of this absolute threshold the retailer's pro…t function may not be unimodal even if the supply chain's pro…t function is unimodal. Furthermore, for the supplier to earn a positive pro…t, we must have ! % 5 ;.
6
As with the QF contract, the sales-rebate contract struggles with the price-setting newsvendor. To coordinate price and generate a positive pro…t for the supplier (i.e., ! % 5 ;), we must at least have
we see (9) is achieved only with ; = ! % . In that case + ! = ' ! is needed to coordinate the quantity decision, so the supplier earns zero pro…t.
Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001) and Taylor (2000) include a buy back with the sales-rebate contract to coordinate the newsvendor with a …xed price but e¤ort dependent demand. Incorporating a buy back may also allow for the coordination of the price setting newsvendor: the rebate induces the retailer to price too low (in an e¤ort to generate sales above the rebate threshold) but a buy back induces the retailer to price too high, so it With a two-part tari¤ the supplier charges a per unit wholesale price, + 2 " and a …xed fee, 1 . Coordination is achieved with marginal cost pricing, + 2 = ' ! " because then the retailer's pro…t is ¦(!" #) ¡ 1 . The …xed fee serves to allocate pro…t between the supplier and the retailer. Since two-part tari¤s achieves the same results as a revenue-sharing contract in the single retailer model, we do not provide an explanation for why one contractual form would be favored over another. However, Dana and Spier (2001) …nd that revenue sharing is more e¤ective when the supplier sells to perfectly competitive retailers. 8 Furthermore, while a single two-part tari¤ can coordinate multiple non-competing retailers, it cannot guarantee an arbitrary allocation of pro…t; the …xed fee would be dictated by the retailer earning the smallest pro…t.
A franchise contract combines revenue sharing with a two-part tari¤: the supplier charges a …xed fee, a per unit wholesale price and a revenue share per transaction, which is usually called a royalty rate. As a result, a franchise contract enjoys the capabilities of both revenue sharing and two-part tari¤s. We discuss further the relationship between revenue sharing and franchise contracts in Section 5.
The …nal contract we consider is a quantity discount contract: the supplier charges the retailer +(!) per unit purchased, where +(!) is a decreasing function:
It too can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate pro…t.
% " # % g maximizes the retailer's pro…t and
Proof : Substitute +(!) into the retailer's pro…t function:
is possible to counteract the deliterious e¤ects of the rebate on price. We leave to future research the con…rmation of this hypothesis.
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In their model revenue sharing achieves coordination but a two-part tari¤ does not.
See Hart and Tirole (1990) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1992) for additional discussion on the challenges of implementing two-part tari¤s with competing retailers.
Since the retailer retains all revenue, the retailer's optimal price for any given ! equals the supply chain's optimal price. Thus, f! % " # % g is optimal if ! % is optimal given # % " which clearly holds for < 5 0:
The upper bound on < ensures the supplier earns a non-negative pro…t.¤ For the …xed price # % " the quantity discount achieves coordination because, as with revenue sharing, the retailer's expected pro…t is proportional to the supply chain's expected pro…t.
However, there are some di¤erences between these contracts. Under revenue sharing, the retailer's pro…t is proportional to the supply chain's pro…t even when the retailer sets a non-optimal price, but not so with the quantity discount. Furthermore, realized pro…ts are not the same with the two contracts because with the quantity discount the retailer pays a fraction of the supply chain's expected revenue (given # % ) whereas with revenue sharing the retailer pays a fraction of realized revenue. In other words, with a quantity discount the supplier earns the same pro…t no matter the realization of demand whereas with revenue sharing the supplier bears some demand risk. Furthermore, because the revenue function is included in +(!)" a single quantity discount schedule can coordinate multiple independent retailers only if they have identical revenue functions.
To summarize, there are many contracts that coordinate the …xed-price newsvendor, including two that are identical to revenue sharing in the sense that they can generate the same pro…ts for both …rms with any realization of revenue: buy-back contracts and price-discount contracts. With a price-setting retailer coordination is achieved with revenue sharing, its equivalent price-discount contract, two-part tari¤s (and its equivalent franchise contract) and quantity discounts. The latter two have some disadvantages relative to revenue sharing with multiple non-competing retailers.
Competing Retailers
This section considers revenue-sharing contracts with = competing retailers. We consider simpler market than that examined above. We assume the revenue earned by retailer 6 (for 6 = 1" ..." =) depends on a single action by each retailer, which we take to be the stocking quantity. We shall show that revenue sharing can coordinate such systems and has some ‡exibility to shift pro…t between players. At the end of this section, we will discuss compe-tition in which retailers must choose stocking quantities and prices. For the special case of perfect competition, Dana and Spier (2001) show that revenue sharing can coordinate the supply chain. We will show that this fails to be true in an oligopoly.
Denote the vector of stocking levels as ¹ ! = f! 1 " . . . " ! . g and expected revenue at retailer
For simplicity we incorporate all salvage revenue into $ & (¹ !) (i.e., the %! term is now incorporated into the revenue function). Possible examples of $ & (¹ !) include competing newsvendors with a …xed retail price (Parlar 1988 and Lippman and McCardle 1997) and
Cournot competition (Tirole, 1988 , Tyagi, 1999 ) with deterministic linear demand, e.g.,
for 0 · > & 1. In the case of a one-for-one relationship between the stocking quantity and the retail price, as with deterministic demand, then it is straightforward to consider the case with revenue determined by the vector of prices. We later discuss revenue functions of Let ' ! be the supplier's production cost per unit and let ' "& be retailer 6's incremental
be the supply chain's pro…t earned at location 6"
and let ¦(¹ !) be the supply chain's total pro…t:
Denote a system optimal vector of quantities as ¹
! % satis…es the following system of …rst-order conditions:
In a decentralized system the supplier o¤ers each retailer a revenue-sharing contract, 
is possible via revenue-sharing contracts.
Theorem 4
The following revenue-sharing contracts coordinate the supply chain with multiple competing retailers and revenue functions $ & (¹ !):
The …rms' optimal pro…ts are
Proof. The …rst order condition for the supply chain has
Given the above and the contract parameters,
See Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) for a discussion on the prevalence of relatively uniform contractual terms in practice.
The pro…t functions follow from straightforward algebra. The retailer's pro…t function is increasing in
From the supply chain …rst order condition,
which implies In Dana and Spier's (2001) setting with perfectly competitive price-setting retailers, a wholesale price does not coordinate the supply chain; revenue sharing is required.
hold (approximately) when there are a large number of similar retailers. If the supplier is legally obligated to o¤er identical contractual terms and the supplier sells to retailers that di¤er in the above mentioned ways, revenue-sharing contracts may improve performance but cannot guarantee supply-chain coordination. O¤ering one set of terms to heterogenous retailers may by default favor some retailers over others. Intuitively, this may explain why some small retailers feel that revenue sharing has put them at a disadvantage to Blockbuster (Warren and Peers, 2002) .
In the single retailer case, we demonstrated that revenue sharing coordinates the quantity and price-setting retailer. However, revenue sharing stumbles with
revenue functions. Consider the latter revenue function. At an optimal solution we have
Hence, the supply chain optimal price is higher than the retailer's optimal price. Furthermore, , & has no power to force the retailer to a higher price. Revenue sharing could accommodate the externalities among retailers with $ & (¹ !) revenue functions because each retailer's externality could be introduced into the retailer's pro…t function via the wholesale price. But the wholesale price is not a consideration when setting the retail price with
, and the single parameter , & is insu¢cient to do the job. In contrast to our result for oligopolistic competition, Dana and Spier (2001) …nd that revenue sharing does coordinate perfectly competitive price-setting newsvendors (i.e., each retailer earns zero pro…t in equilibrium). Bernstein and Federgruen (2000) show that a non-linear form of the price-discount contract coordinates competing retailers with
revenue functions (i.e., price competing newsvendors). Unfortunately, non-linear contracts are more complex to administer than linear contracts.
4 Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale price contracts
With revenue sharing the supplier must be able to ex post verify the retailer's revenue. We have supposed monitoring is costless but this need not be so. At a minimum, the channel would incur the cost of linking the supplier's and retailer's information systems. More likely, the supplier would have to monitor closely how the downstream …rm manages the assets it has purchased. In general, a supplier must balance the costs of running revenue sharing with the pro…t sacri…ced by using a non-coordinating contract. The simplest such contract is the wholesale-price contract. Selling the product outright would then be the only way for the supplier to earn a pro…t. We now consider supply-chain performance with that contract in both single and multi-retailer settings. For simplicity we work with a single revenue function (i.e., revenue from regular sales/rentals is combined with salvage revenue) and assume marginal revenue is decreasing in !. Furthermore, we assume a …xed retail price.
(The single retailer chooses the supply chain optimal price for any quantity with a wholesale price contract.)
The single-retailer case
In the single-retailer setting under a wholesale-price contract, the retailer's optimal quantity is the unique solution to
if $ 0 (0) 5 +" otherwise the optimal order quantity is zero. Since $ 0 (!) is strictly decreasing, from (11) there exists a function +(!) = $ 0 (!) such that ! = arg max -" (!j+(!)). The supplier's pro…t can then be expressed as -! (!)"
The supplier's pro…t function is unimodal in ! if $ 0 (!) + !$ 00 (!) is decreasing in !. This is equivalent to assuming that the elasticity of the retailer's order decreases in !, so successive percentage decreases in the wholesale price bring about smaller and smaller increases in sales.
For tractability, we assume this condition holds.
Let ! ¤ ! be the supplier's optimal quantity to induce. ! the optimal wholesale price is greater than marginal cost, which is in sharp contrast to the optimal wholesale price under a revenue-sharing contract.
The supplier can evaluate any contract in terms of her share of the supply chain's max-
. That share can be divided into two terms, the e¢ciency of the contract (the percentage of the optimal pro…t achieved under that contract) and the supplier's pro…t share of actual supply chain pro…t:
Hence, a wholesale-price contract is attractive to the supplier if its e¢ciency and her pro…t share are close to one.
Since the optimal wholesale price is +(!
, the curvature of the marginal revenue curve $ 0 (!) plays an important role in determining the contract's e¢ciency and pro…t
share. This is shown in Figure 1 . At the optimal solution
, which is the height of the triangle label A 2 " equals the height of the rectangle labeled is concave. Since the area of the triangle is half of the area of the rectangle, the supplier's pro…t share is less (more) than 273 "0! if the marginal revenue is convex (concave).
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Turning to system e¢ciency, the loss in supply-chain pro…t is:
The corresponding region is labeled A 4 in the diagram. An approximation for this loss is the triangle formed by dropping the tangent to
! down to where it crosses the horizontal at '. This happens at 2! ¤ ! . The area of the resulting triangle is again equal to half of supplier's pro…t. It is less than the area of
concave. It is straightforward to see that this also implies !
revenue is concave (convex). Consequently, coordinating the system increases total pro…t by more (less) than 50% of the supplier's pro…t if marginal revenue is convex (concave). It increases by exactly 50% of the supplier's pro…t if marginal revenue is linear.
Interestingly, Rentrak, a video-cassette distributor, claims a retailer should quadruple his order quantity when switching from conventional wholesale-price contracts to revenue sharing 11 Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) present a similar analysis of pro…ts shares for a deterministic demand curve.
(see www.rentrak.com). If we assume optimal contracts are implemented, then the marginal revenue curve in that industry must be quite convex and e¢ciency could be substantially lower than 75%. (Recall that for a linear marginal revenue curve 2! ¤ ! = ! % .) In such a setting, revenue sharing could signi…cantly increase the pro…t of both …rms in the supply chain.
To illustrate these results, suppose $ 0 (!) = 1 ¡ ! 1 " for C 5 0 and ! 2 [0" 1]. Such a marginal revenue curve results if the supply chain faces a deterministic inverse demand curve
Note that the marginal revenue curve is convex for C & 1" linear for C = 1" and concave for C 5 1. Furthermore, it satis…es our assumption that
is decreasing, which guarantees a unique optimal contract for the supplier. Figures 1 and 2 are drawn with that revenue function.
The optimal quantity for the supplier to induce under a wholesale-price contract is
where ! % is the optimal quantity for an integrated channel. The resulting pro…ts are
We see that the pro…t share is (1 + C)7(2 + C) and the e¢ciency is
E¢ciency is an increasing function of C" i.e., e¢ciency improves as the marginal revenue curve becomes more concave. As C ! 0" e¢ciency approaches 27E ¼ 0.73" and as C ! 1, e¢ciency approaches one and the system is coordinated in the limit. However, it approaches coordination rather slowly. For example, with C = 10" which is displayed in Figure 2 , e¢ciency is 86% even though the marginal revenue curve is quite concave. What changes much more quickly is the pro…t share. At C = 10, the supplier now captures 91.7% of the supply chain's pro…t.
To summarize, the potential pro…t gain from coordination in a supply chain with a single retailer depends on the shape of the marginal revenue curve. A convex marginal revenue curve generally leads to worse performance; the decentralized system stocks less than half of the integrated system quantity and e¢ciency is frequently less than 75%. Supply chain e¢ciency is generally higher when the marginal revenue curve is concave.
The multiple-retailer case
This section explores how supply-chain e¢ciency varies with the level of competition among retailers when the supplier o¤ers them a wholesale-price contract. Suppose there are = symmetric retailers and the revenue function in market 6 for 6 = 1" . . . " = is as given in (10).
This structure allows two measures of competition, the parameter > and number of retailers =, with an increase in either implying more intense competition.
For a …xed > and =, there is a unique equilibrium such that !
, so the system is coordinated if the supplier charges
One can show that + % is increasing > and =. As competition increases by either measure, a higher wholesale price is required to moderate competition. Since the total amount the centralized channel sells for a given > is increasing in =" a greater number of retailers in the system thus shifts more pro…t to the supplier if she were to price at + % .
The supplier, however, will not price at + % . From her perspective, + % is too low. Somewhat remarkably, her optimal wholesale price + ¤ = (1 + ') 72 is independent of both > and = (Tyagi, 1999) . The gap between + % and + ¤ is (1 ¡ ') 7 (2 + 2F (= ¡ 1)) and drops to zero as = gets large. Indeed, if > is close to one, the di¤erence between the two wholesale prices is quite small for even low values of =. This suggests the supply chain may not su¤er much loss when the supplier prices to maximize her own pro…t.
Channel e¢ciency when the supplier charges
the system reduces to = independent linear markets and the e¢ciency is 75%. If > 5 0, e¢ciency improves rapidly as the number of retailers increases. For example, if > equals 173, e¢ciency is over 85% with just three retailers while …ve retailers brings e¢ciency over 90%.
Double > to 273, and e¢ciency with three and …ve retailers is 91% and 95.4%, respectively. Tyagi (1999) shows that for essentially any demand structure the supplier's pro…t always increases as more Cournot competitors are added but does not consider the e¢ciency of the supply chain. van Ryzin and Mahajan (2000) do consider system e¢ciency for an inventory problem in which stocking levels of substitute products are set by distinct …rms. They similarly …nd e¢ciency improves rapidly as the number of competitors increases.
Contrasting this example with that of the single-retailer case suggests competition in the retail market may have a greater impact on supply-chain e¢ciency under a wholesaleprice contract than the nature of the revenue function. Thus revenue sharing should be less attractive to the supplier when several competitors serve the market. This is particularly true if there are limited economies of scale in administering revenue sharing so that each retailer added to the system requires a signi…cant additional administrative cost.
Retailer e¤ort and revenue sharing
In our single retailer model revenue depends on the retailer's order quantity and price. However, there are other actions the retailer could take to in ‡uence revenue, e.g., advertising, service quality and store presentation. This section considers how these costly actions in ‡u-ence coordination with revenue-sharing contracts.
Suppose the retailer's expected revenue is $(!" E), where E is a measure of the retailer's e¤ort. (Note, we now …x the retail price and incorporate salvage revenues into a single revenue function.) $(!" E) is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in E. Assume lim 4!1 :$(!" E)7:E = 0, so there is some large e¤ort level that fails to incrementally increase revenue. The retailer chooses both ! and E after observing the terms of the revenue-sharing contract. The retailer incurs a cost G(E) to choose e¤ort level E" but no incremental purchase cost, ' " = 0. G(E) is increasing, di¤erentiable and convex with G (0) = 0.
¦(!" E) is the integrated channel's pro…t function,
Let f! % " E % g be an optimal solution. E % must satisfy
The retailer's pro…t function is
Revenue sharing coordinates the e¤ort decision only if , = 1" but then the retailer's quantity decision is only coordinated if the supplier sells at marginal cost, + = '.
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In the price-dependent newsvendor setting revenue is also determined by two retailer actions. However, revenue sharing coordinates that supply chain because the retailer does not bear any other cost associated with changing #" whereas in the e¤ort case the cost of e¤ort, G(E)" falls entirely on the retailer. Coordinating e¤ort is possible if the supplier could assume part of the e¤ort cost but the retailer then has every reason to misrepresent the true cost incurred. Corbett and DeCroix (2001) make a similar argument.
The franchise literature also demonstrates that revenue sharing (i.e., a royalty rate) reduces a risk neutral retailer's incentive to incur costly e¤ort (see Mathewson and Winter 1985 , Lal 1990 , and Desai 1997 . 13 As a result, the recommended contract is a …xed franchise fee with marginal cost pricing and no revenue sharing. But, as mentioned earlier, there can be situations in which a …xed fee is di¢cult to implement. In those cases the supplier may need to choose between a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale-price contract. Relative 12 Holmstrom (1988) and Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1998) also consider coordination among agents with revenue sharing and non-contractable e¤ort, but in their models there is no comparable quantity action, i.e., an action by one player (in this case the retailer's quantity) that increases the cost of another player (in this case the supplier's production cost).
13
Early work on franchise contracts (e.g., Stiglitz, 1974) highlights the trade o¤ between risk avoidance and incentives. The retailer's risk decreases as his share of revenue decreases, but so does his incentive to exert revenue-enhancing e¤ort. See Gaynor and Gertler (1995) for more recent modeling and empirical work in this vein. In a risk neutral setting, Lal (1990) demonstrates that the supplier may o¤er revenue sharing when the supplier can engage in costly revenue-enhancing e¤ort (e.g., national brand advertising): revenue sharing induces the supplier to engage in such e¤ort. Our model does not consider that motivation for revenue sharing. Other work suggests revenue sharing is used when a franchisor has private information (e.g., the quality of the franchise format) that she wishes to credibly communicate to franchisees (e.g., Gallini and Lutz 1992, Desai and Srinivasan 1995) . That motivation for revenue sharing is also not present in our model. 
The retailer's pro…t function is -" (!" E) = ,$(!" E) ¡ E 2 ¡ !+. Let E(!) be the retailer's unique optimal e¤ort, E(!) = ,H !" and let !(+" ,) be the retailer's optimal quantity condi-
assuming + & ," otherwise !(+" ,) = 0. The supplier's pro…t function is then
Since there exists an optimal wholesale price, +(,), for each ,, the supplier's pro…t function simpli…es to
The supplier's pro…t is increasing in , if H 5 17 p 2" otherwise the supplier's pro…t is decreasing in ,. Consequently, the supplier's optimal contract is a wholesale-price contract (, = 1) if H 5 17 p 2 but is a revenue-sharing contract with , = 0 otherwise. Hence, only if the e¤ort e¤ect dominates (H 5 17 p 2) does the supplier seek to minimize the distortion in the retailer's e¤ort decision by o¤ering a wholesale-price contract. If the impact of e¤ort is small, the supplier prefers to use revenue sharing to extract a large share of supply-chain pro…t even though that pro…t is less than optimal.
Our discussion so far leaves open the question of whether there is a coordinating contract without …xed payments. In the newsvendor setting, Taylor (2000) shows that the combination of a sales-rebate contract with a buy-back contract coordinates the supply chain. The sales rebate gives the retailer too much incentive to exert e¤ort, but the buy-back reduces and price. The supplier sells at a wholesale price below marginal cost, but her participation in the retailer's revenue more than o¤sets the loss on sales. We have shown that the widely studied buy-back contract of Pasternack (1985) is a special case of our proportional revenuesharing contract when the retail price is …xed. However, revenue sharing coordinates a broader array of supply chains than buy backs. In particular, revenue sharing continues to coordinate a newsvendor with price dependent demand, which buy backs cannot.
With so much going for it, one might argue that revenue sharing should be ubiquitous.
We present some reasons why it is not. First, while revenue sharing coordinates retailers that competing on quantity, it does not coordinate retailers that compete on price and quantity.
Second, there are cases in which the gains from revenue sharing over a simpler wholesale-price contract may not cover revenue sharing's additional administrative expense. In particular, revenue sharing's incremental improvement over the wholesale-price contract diminishes as the revenue function becomes more concave or as retail competition intensi…es.
We also demonstrate that revenue sharing may not be attractive if the retailer's actions in ‡uence demand. Speci…cally, we assume that the retailer can increase demand by exerting costly e¤ort and that this e¤ort is non-contractable. Since revenue-sharing contracts reduce the retailer's incentive to undertake e¤ort relative to a wholesale-price contract, the supplier may prefer o¤ering a wholesale-price contract. In other words, while revenue-sharing contracts are e¤ective at coordinating the retailer's purchase quantity and pricing decisions, they work against the coordination of the retailer's e¤ort decision. When demand is suf…ciently in ‡uenced by retail e¤ort, revenue-sharing contracts should be avoided. However, a variation on revenue sharing, best described as a quantity discount, does coordinate the supply chain with e¤ort dependent demand and allocates rents without the use of …xed fees.
Other factors beyond those we have considered may in ‡uence the decision to o¤er revenue sharing. For instance, a retailer may carry substitute or complementary products from other suppliers. If one supplier o¤ers revenue sharing and the other does not in the substitute case, the retailer could be predisposed to favor the supplier that allows the retailer to keep all revenue by, for example, recommending the product to undecided consumers. In the case of complements (say, personal computers and printers), the retailer may discount the product o¤ered under revenue sharing to spur sales of the other product. Here revenue sharing may result in a product being used as a loss leader. We leave these issues to future research.
We began this paper with a discussion of the video cassette rental industry, so we close with it as well. Our model suggests that in a wholesale-price contract the optimal wholesale price should be set above marginal cost, but with revenue sharing the wholesale price should be set below marginal cost. Consistent with that result, the wholesale price in the video industry fell from $65 per tape to $8 per tape when revenue sharing was introduced. A wholesale price of $8 is plausibly below marginal cost (production, royalties, transportation, handling, etc.), so the industry may have adopted a channel coordinating contract.
The adoption of revenue sharing in the video industry is also consistent with the limitations we identi…ed for revenue sharing. The …rst limitation is that administrative costs should be su¢ciently low. Almost all video stores have systems of computers and bar codes to track each tape rental, so it should not be di¢cult for the suppliers to monitor and verify revenues. Further, it is unlikely that retail e¤ort has a su¢cient impact on demand. In a video rental store, the retailer merely displays boxes of available tapes from which customers make their selections. Unlike home appliance or automobile retailing (to name just two examples), customers do not make their video selection after substantial consultation with a retail salesperson (which requires e¤ort). Hence, we feel that the video rental supply chain is particularly suited for revenue sharing. Although there are limits to these contract, we suspect that other industries have yet to discover the virtues of revenue sharing (see Cachon and Lariviere, 2001 ). 
